I. INTRODUCTION We consider in this paper an exchange economy of Debreu type with only one commodity, land . This commodity is modeled by a measure space (L, 21l, v) , wherein 03 is a <T-algebra of subsets of Land v: 2Jl ~ R + is a non-trival finite measure on L: 0 < v(L) < :x: (cf. Berliant (1982) and Dunz (1984) ) .
• Financial support under KBN Grant PB 66412/91 is gratefully acknowledged . To investigate these types of economies we introduce (cf. Legut et a/. (1992) ) a transferable utility game (N, v<t) : : : : ; f J; dv for all i E s}.
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In this paper we will prove a connection between the equilibrium payoffs of the TU-game (N, vl) and the NTU-game (N, V'€). The interpretation of the functions!; is different depending on the point of view we take. If we consider these functions from a TU-point of view, we are assuming that there is an exogeneously given medium, "money," by which utility can be transfered from one agent to another. Then the function values of J; have the dimension [$/m 2 ], wherein $is a unit for the exogeneously given medium "money." The utility of a parcel C has the dimension [$] . If we take an NTU-point of view, the values off; have the dimension [p./ m 2 ] , where [p.;] is the unit of subjective utility of player i. Then U;(C) = fc J; dv has the dimension [p.;] . We must assume that the preferences of agent i over parcels C determine the utility density J;
up to positive affine transformations (otherwise the integrals fc J; dv makes no sense). The utilities must be cardinally determined. There are more differences between both interpretations of the utilities. In an NTU-setting, e.g., an economy in which one player owns all the land (A; = L and Aj = 0 if j ¥-i) is trivial, as no trade can take place. In a TV-interpretation this economy is not trivial, as players j ¥-i can buy parcels from player i by means of "money."
Further, the concept of competitive equilibrium is different in both contexts. In an NTV-setting a collection of \lJ.I-subsets X = {X;}iEN is a competitive equilibrium if there is a (price) density g: L-R+ such that (i) {X;};eN is a partition (the market clears), (ii) fx g dv :5 fA . g dv for all i E N (budget constraint),
if f c /; dv > fx /; dv, then fc g dv > fA g dv (maximality con-
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The NTU-equilibrium payoff associated with the competitive equilibrium {X;};EN is the N-vector x with coordinates X; : = fx J; dv for all agents iE N.
I
In a TV-setting condition (i) stays and condition (ii) disappears: there is no budget constraint, as "money" can be used to balance any difference between selling and purchasing. Condition (iii) becomes (iii)' fx (/; -g) dv 2: fc (/; -g) dv for every parcel C E \lJ.I (maximality).
The TV-equilibrium payoff associated with {X;};EN has the coordinates X;:= fx (/;-g) dv +fA g dv. In this paper we are going to compare the TV-and NTU-equilibrium payoffs. We shall prove that these equilibrium payoff are connected by "b-transfer."
First we recall the definition of the b-transfer of an NTV-game. Let (N, V) be an NTU-game and bE R':. The b-transfer of the game (N, V) is the TU-game tb(V) with values
The set {(b, x) I x E V(S)} is not always bounded for every coalition, but if it is, the b-transfer can be defined. In Shapley (1969) the economy with land, wherein each utility density fi is multiplied with b; .
MAIN RESULTS
As before we start with a measurable space (L, ~. v), wherein Lis a nonempty set, ~ is a <T-algebra of subsets of L, and v: ~ ~ R + is a finite non-trivial measure.
An economy with land consists of a finite set of agents N, and for each agent i EN, a v-measurable initial endowment A; c Land a nonnegative (essentially) bounded v-measurable utility density fi on L. The integral U;( C) : = fc fi dv gives the appreciation of agent i for the measurable set C. We assume that the following conditions hold:
(a) The measure v is non-atomic; i.e., for every set E E 00 with
(b) The utilities fi are almost everywhere positive:
(c) The economy 'i£ is non-trivial; i.e., at least two agents have an Proof. Let { Y;hes be an improvement of coalitionS upon {X;};eN. Then In the proof we used the theorem of Lyapounov (1940) It is the goal of this paper to characterize equilibrium payoffs by btransfer. In the following proposition we characterize, as a first step, the Pareto optimal allocations by b-transfer. It is sufficient to prove that ll;ec a;,u(iJ 2:: I for every cycle C of the permutation a-of length 2::2 . Without loss of generality we assume that It Is typical for economies with land that the trades necessary to reach a reallocation {X;};eN can be reconstructed from the reallocation {X; heN.
The parcels A; n X 1 are sold by agent ito agentj and the payments (under a price regime g) are fA nx g dv. Therefore, it is not surprising that we need, in the proof of th'e fnain theorem, a theorem from the theory of flows. In fact we use the following theorem of Hoffman (1960) . 
Proof. Let {X 1 tEN be an NTU-competitive equilibrium with price density g. Let b; be the infimum of the real numbers t such that the set {x E X, I g(x) ~ tJ;(x)} has v-measure zero: sup essx g/ J;. Note 
Conversely , if th-ere is a vector b satisfying the conditions of the theorem, we prove that there is a bounded v-measurable function g such that Before we come to the final version of the main theorem we have to recall some results of Legut et al. (1994) .
(a) In Legut et al. (1994) In this final section we will answer three fundamental questions about the model we used in this paper.
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First the meaning of a TV-model and particularly ofTU-equilibria can be questioned. Indeed, a TU-model needs many preassumptions to make sense. It assumes, e.g., that there is an externality like money, equally appreciated by all the agents, and that in the economy to be considered "money is not the problem'' or, to say it differently, every player must have enough "outside assets" to balance the difference between his buyings and his sellings. Under these circumstances it makes sense to fix a price that "clears the market" and gives after all the agents a payoff, partially in goods (land) and partially in money, that is as high as possible. This is exactly the TV-equilibrium concept we propose. In fact, there is some tradition in modeling economic situations by TU-games (see, e.g., the house market model of Shapley and Shubik (1972) and Kaneko (1976 Kaneko ( ), (1982 ). Finally this paper shows that TV-equilibria are tightly connected with economically not suspect NTU-equilibria.
The second question raises the issue of how far a commodity like "land" differs from traditional commodities.
(2) What is special to the commodity "land" compared with "normal commodities"?
The main difference is the uniqueness of parcels of land. A parcel can be bought from the owner and from nobody else. This makes it possible to trace back who bought what parcel from whom after the trades are made. In an economy with normal commodities (like crude oil or milk) this cannot be done uniquely. In the paper we use this idea by comparing the trading behavior with a flow of goods and money. Loosely speaking, land can be seen as an overwhelming number of indivisible goods (the points of L) that can be traded only in some combinations (the measurable sets).
The last question is about the kind of utility functions we considered.
(3) What do the utility functions have the form they have? Indeed, a difficult commodity like land requires a more sophisticated utility function. In our first paper on this subject (Legut et al. (1992) ) we referred to the Ph.D. dissertations of Berliant (1982) and Dunz (1984) , wherein attempts are made to consider more general utility functions. But even the most general utility concept we know of (utility functions only continuous with respect to an atomless measure (Dunz (1984) ) cannot deal with all the intricacies of a commodity like land. Here global geometrical or topological concepts like shape of parcels, connectedness, or ]-connectedness (there no enclaves owned by somebody else) play an important role. Therefore we used the simpler utility functions, as the more sophisticated ones are not doing the job better.
